Cumulative Record. Chapter 39: Some Quantitative Properties of Anxiety. Quote 1
Anxiety has at least two defining characteristics: (1) it is an emotional state, somewhat resembling fear, and (2) the disturbing stimulus which is principally responsible does not precede or accompany the state but is “anticipated” in the future. (p. 559)
Cumulative Record. Chapter 35: Two Types of Conditioned Reflex and a Pseudo-type. Quote 3
… the magnitude of the response in an operant is not a measure of its strength. Some other measure must be devised, and from the definition of an operant it is easy to arrive at the rate of occurrence of the response. This measure has been shown to be significant in a large number of […]
Cumulative Record. Chapter 35: Two Types of Conditioned Reflex and a Pseudo-type. Quote 2
But there is also a kind of response which occurs spontaneously in the absence of any stimulation with which it may be specifically correlated … It is the nature of this kind of behavior that it should occur without an eliciting stimulus, although discriminative stimuli are practically inevitable after conditioning. It is not necessary to […]
Cumulative Record. Chapter 35: Two Types of Conditioned Reflex and a Pseudo-type. Quote 1
There is, first, the kind of response which is made to specific stimulation, where the correlation between response and stimulus is a reflex in the traditional sense. I shall refer to such a reflex as a respondent and use the term also as an adjective in referring to the behavior as a whole. (p. 537)
Cumulative Record. Chapter 34: The Generic Nature of the Concepts of Stimulus and Response. Quote 6
Our rule that the generic term may be used only when its experimental reality has been verified will not admit the possibility of an ancillary principle, available in and peculiar to the study of behavior, leading to the definition of concepts through some other means than the sort of experimental procedure here outlined. (p. 521)
Cumulative Record. Chapter 34: The Generic Nature of the Concepts of Stimulus and Response. Quote 4
[The] restriction upon the use of the popular vocabulary in behaviorism is often not felt because the partial legitimacy of the popular term frequently results in some experimental consistency. (pp. 520-521)
Cumulative Record. Chapter 34: The Generic Nature of the Concepts of Stimulus and Response. Quote 3
. . . the existence of a popular term does create some presumption in favor of the existence of a corresponding experimentally real concept. But this does not free us from the necessity of defining the class and of demonstrating the reality if the term is to be used for scientific purposes. It has still […]
Cumulative Record. Chapter 34: The Generic Nature of the Concepts of Stimulus and Response. Quote 1
The analysis of behavior is not an act of arbitrary subdividing, and we cannot define the concepts of stimulus and response quite as simply as “parts of behavior and environment” without taking account of the natural lines of fracture along which behavior and environment actually break. (p. 504)
Cumulative Record. Chapter 33: The Concept of the Reflex in the Description of Behavior. Quote 6
… we may now take that more humble view of explanation and causation which seems to have been first suggested by Mach and is now a common characteristic of scientific thought, wherein, in a word, explanation is reduced to description and the notion of function substituted for that of causation. (pp. 494-495)
Cumulative Record. Chapter 33: The Concept of the Reflex in the Description of Behavior. Quote 4
The definition of the subject matter of any science, however, is determined largely by the interest of the scientist, and this will be our safest rule here. We are interested primarily in the movement of an organism in some frame of reference. (p. 494)
Cumulative Record. Chapter 33: The Concept of the Reflex in the Description of Behavior. Quote 3
Lacking some arbitrary distinction, the term behavior must include the total activity of the organism—the functioning of all its parts. Obviously, its proper application is much less general, but it is difficult to reach any clear distinction. (p. 494)
Cumulative Record. Chapter 33: The Concept of the Reflex in the Description of Behavior. Quote 1
The operational analysis of Sherrington’s synapse and the more generalized statement . . . in which I suggested that C.N.S. might be taken to stand for the Conceptual Nervous System, have been interpreted as showing an anti-physiological or anti-neurological bias. I was, however, merely protesting the use of inferences from behavior to explain behavior, while […]
Cumulative Record. Chapter 32: Why Are the Behavioral Sciences Not More Effective. Quote 26
Perhaps human behavior can be controlled via the environment, but who will exert the control? . . . What [those who ask that question] should be asking is: “What kinds of cultural contingencies induce people to engage in the control of other people? Under what contingencies do people act like tyrants? Under what contingencies do […]
Cumulative Record. Chapter 32: Why Are the Behavioral Sciences Not More Effective. Quote 25
Governments still hold the individual responsible and are said to be best if they govern least, because a person is then free to behave well because of inner virtues. All this continues to divert attention from the task of building a social environment in which people behave well with respect to each other, acquire effective […]
Cumulative Record. Chapter 32: Why Are the Behavioral Sciences Not More Effective. Quote 24
And industry still selects workers who are industrious, skilled, and careful; it has not given serious attention to the design of contingencies under which everyone works hard and carefully and enjoys his work. (p. 473)
Cumulative Record. Chapter 32: Why Are the Behavioral Sciences Not More Effective. Quote 23
In psychotherapy, the medical analogy persists: the problem is mental illness, and it is the patient who must be cured. The therapist tries to reach his patient by making an interpersonal contact, not by changing an environment. (p. 473)
Cumulative Record. Chapter 32: Why Are the Behavioral Sciences Not More Effective. Quote 21
New practices in child care, in the management of institutionalized retardates and psychotics, in individual psychotherapy, in classroom management, in the design of incentive systems in industry and elsewhere are being tested. We are, I think, on our way to the technology we need to solve many of our problems. But progress is dishearteningly slow […]
Cumulative Record. Chapter 32: Why Are the Behavioral Sciences Not More Effective. Quote 20
It is hard to imagine a group of young people more completely out of control of the culture of their country [than young offenders living in a school for juvenile delinquents]. But they are not out of control of their own culture, and they may be brought under the control of a better one. (p. […]
Cumulative Record. Chapter 32: Why Are the Behavioral Sciences Not More Effective. Quote 17
If a young person does not work productively, it is not because he does not like his job or is lazy; it is because the contingencies are defective. His feeling about his job, and the traits of character he displays in it, are by-products of the same contingencies. (p. 471)
Cumulative Record. Chapter 32: Why Are the Behavioral Sciences Not More Effective. Quote 16
If a young person often stays away from school or drops out, it is not because he is shiftless, or lacks curiosity, or is dull; it is because the contingencies of reinforcement do not keep him at school. (pp. 470-471)
Cumulative Record. Chapter 32: Why Are the Behavioral Sciences Not More Effective. Quote 15
What happens when a student behaves well toward his teachers and other students, and what happens when he behaves badly? Does he study mainly to avoid the consequences of not studying or are there positive effects—such as conspicuous progress toward the mastery of a subject or skill? How long will it be before the behavior […]
Cumulative Record. Chapter 32: Why Are the Behavioral Sciences Not More Effective. Quote 13
How reinforcing is a young person’s home simply as a physical place? How does it look or sound or smell? How often do other members of his family reinforce him with attention, approval, or affection—and for what behavior? How often do they disapprove of him and punish him? What competing contingencies await him elsewhere? Do […]
Cumulative Record. Chapter 32: Why Are the Behavioral Sciences Not More Effective. Quote 11
The behaviorist is often said to treat behavior simply as response to stimuli, but that view has long been out of date. Three things must be taken into account: the situation in which behavior occurs, the behavior itself, and its consequences. These three things are interrelated in very intricate ways in what are called the […]
Cumulative Record. Chapter 32: Why Are the Behavioral Sciences Not More Effective. Quote 10
It has long been recognized that some effects of a person’s behavior are satisfying or rewarding, but a special significance is emphasized when we call these effects “reinforcing”: they strengthen the behavior they are contingent upon, in the sense of making it more likely to occur again. (p. 470)
Cumulative Record. Chapter 32: Why Are the Behavioral Sciences Not More Effective. Quote 8
In hundreds of laboratories throughout the world, complex environments are arranged and their effects studied. The evidence grows more and more convincing that a person behaves as he does because of (1) what has happened in the distant past as his species evolved, and (2) what has happened to him in his lifetime as an […]
Cumulative Record. Chapter 32: Why Are the Behavioral Sciences Not More Effective. Quote 6
The feeling or state of mind seems to be a necessary link in a causal chain, but the fact is that we change behavior by changing the environment, and, in doing so, change what is felt. Feelings and states of mind are not causes, they are by-products. (p. 469)
Cumulative Record. Chapter 32: Why Are the Behavioral Sciences Not More Effective. Quote 5
By reinforcing nonverbal and verbal behavior in particular ways, we change what a person says or does, but what he says or does is not due to his opinions or attitudes but to the contingencies of reinforcement we have arranged. (p. 469)
Cumulative Record. Chapter 32: Why Are the Behavioral Sciences Not More Effective. Quote 3
According to [the traditional] explanation [of behavior problems], our task is to correct disturbed personalities, change troubled states of mind, make people feel wanted, give them purpose or a sense of pride in their work, allay their frustration, and teach them the value of order, security, and affluence. But we have no direct access to […]
Cumulative Record. Chapter 32: Why Are the Behavioral Sciences Not More Effective. Quote 2
I shall argue, in short, that the social sciences are not more effective precisely because they are not fully behavioral, and for that reason not really scientific, and for that reason not commensurate with the problems they are asked to solve. (p. 468)
Cumulative Record. Chapter 32: Why Are the Behavioral Sciences Not More Effective. Quote 1
An expanding population will exhaust our resources and pollute the environment and sooner or later (sooner if we suffer a nuclear holocaust) put an end to the kind of world in which the species can live . . . To do so we need a much clearer understanding of why people behave as they do. […]
Cumulative Record. Chapter 31: The Processes Involved in the Repeated Guessing of Alternatives. Quote 3
The first guess in a series of five, as in the Zenith experiments, is apparently controlled by an abiding preference, by biased preliminary conditions, or by trivial circumstances which cancel out in the long run and are spoken of as “chance.” The second guess raises a different problem, for it is under the additional control […]
Cumulative Record. Chapter 31: The Processes Involved in the Repeated Guessing of Alternatives. Quote 1
To speak of a series of five guesses as a single organized act is perhaps in line with one trend in modern psychology, but a possible alternative view, in which a unit of behavior is taken at a lower level of analysis, needs to be stated. (p. 455)
Cumulative Record. Chapter 28: The Operational Analysis of Psychological Terms. Quote 50
… I contend that my toothache is just as physical as my typewriter, though not public, and I see no reason why an objective and operational science cannot consider the processes through which a vocabulary descriptive of a toothache is acquired and maintained. (pp. 429-430)
Cumulative Record. Chapter 28: The Operational Analysis of Psychological Terms. Quote 49
The distinction between public and private is by no means the same as that between physical and mental. That is why methodological behaviorism (which adopts the first) is very different from radical behaviorism (which lops off the latter term in the second). The result is that while the radical behaviorist may in some cases consider […]